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IV 
I. JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This Court granted the Writ of Certiorari filed by Appellant Mleads Enterprises, 
Inc. ("Mleads") as to the following issue: 
Whether due process permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant who sends 
an email without knowledge of the residence of the recipient or the location at 
which the recipient will retrieve the message. 
This appeal presents the issue of law, (see Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, p. 2 
(1999)), of whether a finding of personal jurisdiction solely on the basis of a single email 
that was unknowingly accessed in Utah, without any other contacts whatever, violates the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and Utah's long-arm statute. 
III. STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
APPEAL 
1. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution (reproduced at 
Appendix 1 hereto). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a plaintiffs attempt to hale into court an Arizona-based 
company that has no contacts with the State of Utah and which did not direct any activity 
to the State of Utah, but sent a single email that was accessed from Utah. Brittney Fenn 
("Fenn") alleged $10 in statutory injuries pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 13-16-101 to 105 
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(Supp. 2002) (the "Statute")) from a single e-mail (the "E-mail"). The record is 
undisputed that the Email was sent by a vendor of Mleads and that Mleads "Mleads did 
not know specifically that [its] agent would send an email to Fenn or to any Utah 
resident." 
The trial court granted Mleads's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Mleads did 
not know, and could not have reasonably anticipated, the E-mail would reach the state of 
Utah or its residents. (R. 88, District Court Order |^ 19.) The Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed and vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding that "[s]ending one email to 
a resident of Utah is sufficient 'contact' to satisfy . . . the minimum contacts requirement 
of due process." The Court of Appeals' "single email rule" contravenes the purposeful 
availment requirements of the Due Process Clause and allows a non-resident defendant to 
be brought into this forum based on random and attenuated contacts. As Judge Bench 
articulated, "It is difficult to imagine a more attenuated contact than the one presented 
here: a single email message sent to a lone Utah recipient." Accordingly, Mleads 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Mleads is an eight (8) employee closely held Arizona corporation that generates 
leads (i.e., expressions of interest by a potential customer) with respect to mortgage and 
home loans. (R. 29 fl| 2 (Declaration of Shay Tyler (hereinafter "Tyler Decl.")).) Mleads 
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generally contracts with third parties (the "Marketing Companies" or in this instance the 
"Marketing Company") to promote its services to end users who "opt-in" or affirmatively 
consent to receive information regarding Mleads services. (R. 29; Tyler Decl. f 3.) 
Mleads does not at any time (except for following the submission of a consumer's 
application to receive information from Mleads, or upon receipt of an unsubscribe 
request) learn any information regarding the locale, identity, or other information of a 
consumer—Mleads does not learn the identity, any contact information, or location of 
consumers prior to the transmission of messages by the Marketing Companies. (R. 29; 
Tyler Decl. f 4.) The Marketing Companies, who are not agents or employees of Mleads, 
warrant and represent to Mleads that at all times, including when transmitting 
promotional messages and e-mails, the Marketing Companies comply with all relevant 
laws and regulations. (R. 29; Tyler Decl. ^ 3.) Upon receiving promotions (e.g., e-mail) 
regarding Mleads, a consumer may fill out an application requesting more information 
regarding a particular loan and transmit such information to Mleads. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. ^ 
5.) Mleads then provides the consumer's information on a batch (non-individual) basis to 
a financial institution which then contacts the consumer regarding a proposed loan. (R. 
30; Tyler Decl. % 6.) 
Mleads lacks a single contact with the State of Utah. Mleads maintains an office 
solely in the State of Arizona and does not maintain any offices in the State of Utah. 
(R. 29; Tyler Decl. Tf 2.) Mleads is not licensed to conduct business in the State of Utah. 
7 
(R. 29; Tyler Decl. ^ 3.) Mleads does not employ any Utah-based employees or agents. 
(R. 29; Tyler Decl. ^ 3.) Mleads does not recruit any employees or agents in the State of 
Utah. Mleads does not have any bank accounts in the State of Utah. (R. 29-30; Tyler 
Decl. Tf 4.) Mleads does not maintain any telephone or facsimile numbers, or list any 
telephone or facsimile numbers in the State of Utah. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. ^ 5.) Mleads 
does not advertise in any Utah newspapers or magazines or other Utah-based media or 
otherwise solicit business in the State of Utah. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. ^ 6.) Mleads does not 
have any Utah-based shareholders. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. ^ 7.) Mleads does not own or 
lease any property in the State of Utah. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. f^ 8.) None of Mleads's 
employees have traveled to Utah on business. (R. 30; Tyler Decl. U 9.) Mleads is not 
subject to taxation in the State of Utah. (R. 30-31; Tyler Decl. ^ 10.) Finally, Mleads 
does not generate any substantial percentage of its revenues from activities in the State of 
Utah. (R. 31; Tyler Decl. j^ 11.) In sum, Mleads has no contacts with the State of Utah. 
The sole alleged contact in this case is the E-mail, which the Marketing Company 
transmitted to Fenn, and which Fenn affirmatively consented to receive and fortuitously 
accessed while in the State of Utah. (R. 31; Tyler Decl. f^ 12.) 
B. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Trial court proceedings. 
Fenn filed this lawsuit on January 3, 2003, alleging a violation of the Statute 
arising from the Email sent to the email address <BAF@heartslc.com>. (R. 2, 
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Complaint.) Fenn did not allege any economic, physical, emotional, or dignitary damages 
from the E-mail. The Complaint contained a sole allegation ostensibly relating to 
jurisdiction: 
Defendant sent, or caused to be sent, to plaintiff an unsolicited commercial e-
mail. 
(R. 86, District Court Order, ^ 9.) Mleads, having no contacts with the State of Utah, 
brought a Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Motion to Dismiss 
was accompanied by the declaration of Shay Tyler ("Tyler Declaration"), principal of 
Mleads. As noted by the District Court, the Tyler Declaration attested that Mleads: 
(a) does not maintain any offices in the State of Utah, (b) does not transact any 
business in the State of Utah, (c) is not licensed to do Business in the State of 
Utah, (d) does not employ or recruit any employees or agents in Utah, (e) does 
not have any bank accounts in Utah, (f) does not maintain telephone or 
facsimile numbers in Utah, (g) does not advertise or solicit business in Utah, 
(h) does not have any shareholders in Utah, (i) does not pay taxes in Utah, 
[and] (j) does not generate any substantial percentage of its revenues from 
activities in Utah. 
(R. 85, District Court Order, ^ 6.) Fenn filed a responsive pleading without any 
accompanying evidence or testimony—i.e., Fenn "rested on the very general factual 
allegations made in [the] Complaint." (R. 85, District Court Order, \ 8.) Fenn instead 
relied on the argument that Mleads had somehow waived its jurisdictional argument by 
appearing generally. Fenn further argued that the Statute itself conferred jurisdiction, and 
that Fenn's general allegations were sufficient to find jurisdiction. (R. 86, District Court 
Order, TI10.) 
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The District Court rejected Fenn's arguments that jurisdiction was conferred by the 
Statute (R. 86, District Court Order, Tf 13.) or that Mleads had waived its jurisdictional 
argument by not making a special appearance. (R. 86, District Court Order, ^ 11.) The 
District Court considered the minimal jurisdictional allegations of the Complaint, along 
with the allegations of Tyler Declaration, which, because they were not controverted by 
specific allegations, were taken as true. The District Court concluded, based on these 
operative facts, that personal jurisdiction was not present in this case. (R. 88; District 
Court Order, Tl 10.) 
2. The decision of the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals considered the issue of "whether the state can exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who caused one unsolicited commercial e-mail to 
be sent to a resident of the state." Fenn v. Mleads Enterprises, Inc., 2004 UT App. 412, 
p. 3, 103 P.3d 156 (2004). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that "Mleads did not 
know specifically that the agent would send an email to Fenn or to any Utah resident." 
Fenn, 2004 UT App. 412 p. 2. The court did not end its inquiry there. The court instead 
focused on the volitional aspect of Mleads's transmission of the E-mail, which it viewed 
as determinative: 
The extent to which defendant caused the result is the more important aspect 
of the analysis. Mleads caused its agent to send email, and the agent sent an 
email to Fenn, who is a resident of Utah. The record does not disclose whether 
the agent sent a large volume of email all over the country or whether it sent 
one email to Fenn specifically. In either case, Mleads directed its agent to 
solicit business, and that direction instantiates the purpose that makes the 
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connection more than an "attenuated nexus." 
Fenn, 2004 UT App. 412, p. 21. In the view of the Court of Appeals, jurisdiction was 
appropriate because Mleads took voluntary action, regardless of whether that action was 
aimed at the State of Utah. 
Judge Bench dissented from the decision of the Court of Appeals. Although Judge 
Bench did not write an opinion accompanying his dissenting vote he explained his 
reasoning in a different case: 
I dissented in Fenn because I do not believe that a single email can vest Utah 
with personal jurisdiction over the defendant-sender where the 
plaintiff-recipient alleges no injury resulting from the transmission of the 
email. In order to satisfy the jurisdictional inquiry, due process requires that a 
nonresident defendant "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum state." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 
235,253,2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958). This "requirement ensures 
that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of. . . 
'attenuated1 contacts." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,475,85 
L. Ed. 2d 528, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984)). 
It is difficult to imagine a more attenuated contact than the one presented here: 
a single email message sent to a lone Utah recipient. Here, as in Fenn, there is 
no allegation "that the email caused any reputational, economic, emotional, or 
physical 'injury.'" Fenn, 2004 UT App 412 at P20. In both cases, the plaintiffs 
allege only statutory damages often dollars. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105 
(Supp. 2003) 
To craft its single email rule, the Fenn majority relied in part on Starways, Inc. 
v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, 980 P.2d 204. In Starways, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the nonresident defendants' alleged transmission of libelous 
facsimiles vested Utah with jurisdiction. Id. at P9. Although the Fenn majority 
recognized that the absence of alleged injury in Fenn distinguished it from 
Starways, the majority concluded that this distinction was unimportant. Fenn, 
2004 UT App 412 at PP20-21. However, I believe that Starways should 
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prevent Utah from taking jurisdiction over cases where no injury is alleged. 
The single email rule established by Fenn therefore improperly ignores the 
"'quality and nature'" of the defendant's contact, vesting jurisdiction based 
solely on a single contact within Utah, however trivial. Starways, 1999 UT 50 
at P8 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,319,90 L. 
Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945)). Thus, contrary to the view of my colleagues, I 
believe that intentional contact alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the principle of judicial deference to legislative determinations 
should play no role in our due process inquiry. 
Weaver v. Directlink Media Group, LLC, 2004 UT App 471 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) 
(unpublished decision). This Court granted Mleads's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on 
March 17, 2005. 
VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Supreme Court reviews this appeal of a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction de novo. Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, p. 2 (1999). Id. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Due Process requires that the foreign defendant purposefully avail itself of the 
forum state. The only evidence on appeal of any such purposeful action by Mleads is a 
single email sent by a vendor of Mleads which Mleads had no knowledge or reason to 
know would be received in Utah. A "single email rule" is contrary to well established 





A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT REQUIRES PURPOSEFUL 
DIRECTION OF ACTIVITY TOWARD THE FORUM STATE OR PLAINTIFF 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution limits a state's power to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 
defendant. U.S. Const, amend. XIV. "[The] constitutional touchstone of the 
determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process [is] 
whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum state." 
Asahi Metal Indus, Co, v. California, 480 U.S. 102, 109, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 
(1987) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Arguello v. 
Industrial Woodworking Machine Co,, 838 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1992) (quoting 
International Shoe Co, v, Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1995)). 
1. Minimum contacts requires purposeful direction. 
The minimum contacts requirement serves to protect a defendant against the 
burden of litigation in a distant or inconvenient forum, and to ensure that states do not 
reach beyond the limits of sovereignty imposed by their role in the federal system. 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp, v, Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 
2d 490 (1980). As noted by the Court of Appeals in this case, "[a] democratic 
government must exercise its powers against only those who have in some way assented 
to the governmental power." Fenn, 2004 UT 412 p. 14. Under United States Supreme 
Court precedent, the minimum contacts underlying the assertion of jurisdiction must have 
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some basis in the non-resident defendant's purposeful actions within the forum state, or 
directed towards the forum state. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 812, 104 S. Ct. 
1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984). The purposeful availment requirement ensures that 
defendants will not be "haled into a jurisdiction through 'random,' fortuitous,' or 
'attenuated' contacts." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 104 S. Ct. 
1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1985). The operative term "purposeful" clearly contemplates 
some knowledge or intentionality requirement of the defendant vis a vis the forum state. 
2. Mleads lacked minimum contacts in this case. 
The present case presents an extreme example of a non-resident defendant who is 
haled into court based on a completely random, fortuitous or attenuated contact. The 
Record indicates Mleads itself does not have any contacts with the State of Utah, and 
Mleads hired the Marketing Company (based in the state of Florida) to assist in business 
promotion. (R. 28, Tyler Declaration, ^ 3.) Marketing Company assured Mleads that at 
all times Marketing Company complied with relevant laws. (R. 28, Tyler Declaration, 
U 3.) Additionally, Marketing Company did not provide to Mleads the locale of the end 
users to which the Marketing Company directs its promotion or advertising efforts or any 
other specific information regarding consumers, including their state of residence. (R. 
28-9, Tyler Declaration, f^ 4.) Marketing Company did not provide any such information 
even when Mleads requested. (R. 29, Tyler Declaration, f 4.) Mleads was never aware 
of Fenn's identity, location, or state of residence before Fenn sued Mleads in Utah. (R. 
14 
29, Tyler Declaration, ^ 4.) Fenn did not put forth any evidence indicating, or even 
allege, that Mleads sold any product or services, directly marketed any product or 
services, or advertised any product or services to consumers in the State of Utah, or ever 
contemplated marketing here. The Email itself was sent to a location-neutral address, 
<BAF@heartslc.com>. (R. 2, Complaint.) The uncontroverted fact dispositive in this 
case is Mleads did not know any promotions would ever reach the state of Utah. Indeed, 
the Court of Appeals noted that "Mleads did not know specifically that the agent would 
send an email to Fenn or to any Utah resident." Thus, Mleads did not undertake any 
purposeful act to avail itself to the laws and benefits of the State of Utah; nor did Mleads 
direct any actions towards the State of Utah or its residents, including Fenn. Jurisdiction 
is thus not proper under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 
3. Application of traditional jurisdictional principles requires reversal of 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with personal jurisdiction and 
Due Process jurisprudence. Merely because the subject of this lawsuit pertains to 
communications over a global distribution mechanism, the Internet, does not justify 
modification centuries old jurisprudence. Courts and commentators have repeatedly 
cautioned that traditional principles of jurisdiction should not be abandoned in 
cyberspace. See e.g., Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 
1154, 1160 (D. Wis. 2004) ("traditional principles of due process are sufficient to decide 
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personal jurisdiction questions in the internet context"); Design88 Ltd. v. Power Uptik 
Prods., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21042 (D. Va. 2000) ("orthodox principles of in personam 
jurisdiction simply did not wholly evaporate into cyberspace"); Hon. Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. Cm. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (1996) 
(counseling against developing specialized tests for cyberspace). Indeed, "[s]ince a 
defendant's Internet activity is not different from activity in real space, the Internet is not 
so different that it requires the application of new or technology-specific rules." Titi 
Nguyen, A Survey ofPersonalJurisdiction Based on Internet Activity: A Return to 
Tradition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 519, 541 (2004). 
The United States Supreme Court expressly held that a non-resident distributor 
cannot be haled into court in a locale merely because one of its products happened to 
reach the locale. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. California, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 
94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1986). In Asahi, the Supreme Court reiterated the purposeful availment 
requirement, stressing that Due Process requires some conscious action on the part of the 
non-resident defendant which is directed towards the forum state. Asahi also stands for 
the proposition that a non-resident defendant cannot be subject to jurisdiction in a state 
based on its release of instrumentalities into the stream of commerce that happen to reach 
the forum state and cause injury in the forum state. 
Asahi involved the state of California's attempt to assert jurisdiction over Asahi 
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. ("Asahi"), a Japanese company. Asahi manufactured a tube 
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assembly that found its way into a motorcycle tire that exploded while being driven by a 
California resident in California. The Supreme Court found that the State of California 
could not constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi, notwithstanding 
Asahi's awareness that the tube assembly may find its way to California. The Court 
relied on the fact that Asahi had not taken "any action to purposefully avail itself of the 
California market." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105. Indeed, the Court reaffirmed that the 
connection between the non-resident defendant and the forum state "must come about by 
an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id (emphasis 
added): 
Assuming, arguendo, that respondents have established Asahi's awareness that 
some of the valves sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated into tire tubes 
sold in California, respondents have not demonstrated any action by Asahi to 
purposefully avail itself of the California market. Asahi does not do business 
in California. It has no office, agents, employees, or property in California. It 
does not advertise or otherwise solicit business in California. It did not create, 
control, or employ the distribution system that brought its valves to California. 
There is no evidence that Asahi designed its product in anticipation of sales in 
California. On the basis of these facts, the exertion of personal jurisdiction 
over Asahi by the Superior Court of California exceeds the limits of due 
process. 
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted). 
Mleads is in the same position as Asahi; and the email Fenn received is similar to 
Asahi's tube assembly. Asahi sold its tube assemblies to tire manufacturers (who then 
sold the tires to motorcycle manufacturers) and could not predict the states in which the 
tube assemblies may cause injuries. Likewise, in this case Mleads did not direct the E-
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mail to Utah or to Fenn in particular; and Mleads could not have predicted a Utah resident 
would receive the E-mail here. The United States Supreme Court held that Asahi did not 
subject itself to jurisdiction in the State of California for an accident that happened to 
occur in California from Asahi's product. The Court ruled that jurisdiction was not 
proper because Asahi did not intentionally direct its product to the State of California. 
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107-08. The Court noted that Asahi knew some tube assemblies would 
find their way to California; but, the Court would not allow for personal jurisdiction 
because Asahi did not direct its activities to California. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 104. Like 
Asahi, Mleads did not direct its activities to Utah. Additionally, Mleads did not know any 
emails would reach Utah. Accordingly, pursuant to Asahi, jurisdiction is not proper in 
this case. 
4. Transmission of e-mail alone, without prior knowledge of the 
recipient's state of residence, cannot support jurisdiction. 
The sender of an e-mail has no ability to differentiate from what location in the 
world an e-mail will be accessed. See Hydro Engineering, Inc. v. Landa, Inc., 231 F. 
Supp. 2d 1130,1136, fn. 1 (CD. Utah 2002) ("[e-mail] addresses [do] not identify the 
particular state in which the e-mail was actually received, opened"^ (emphasis added). 
Fenn could have accessed her e-mail via any world wide web-enabled device located in 
any city, state or country on the planet. Even if Mleads or Marketing Company intended 
the E-mail to be accessed in the State of Utah, neither Marketing Company nor Mleads 
could control where the recipients accessed such e-mails. Kaempe v. Myers, 2001 U.S. 
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Dist. LEXIS 18386 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (noting the absence of control over the location of 
receipt of e-mail because an "e-mail could have been retrieved from anywhere in the 
world") (emphasis added). Thus, where the record does not contain evidence that the 
non-resident defendant knew of the state of plaintiff s residence prior to sending an e-
mail, the transmission of a single e-mail, without more, cannot form sufficient basis for 
jurisdiction. 
B. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT REQUIRES PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT 
1. This Court has rejected jurisdiction based on random acts. 
Utah courts,1 following the United States Supreme Court, have similarly required 
purposeful availment as a prerequisite to the assertion of jurisdiction. For example, in 
Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
the assertion of personal jurisdiction requires 
1
 Federal courts sitting in Utah have reached similar results. In Stewart v. 
Hennesey, the United States District Court for the District of Utah held that it could 
properly assert jurisdiction over a non-resident automobile upgrade business due to the 
e-mails and telephone conversations exchanged between the Utah plaintiff and the 
non-resident defendant. Stewart v. Hennesey, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1203 (D. Utah 
2002). In relying on the e-mail based contacts between the Utah plaintiff and the 
non-resident defendant the court distinguished between a non-residenfs act of making a 
world wide website generally available and the act of intentionally communicating with 
the plaintiff via the world wide website. The court noted that M[c]ourts have emphasized 
'purposeful availment,5 . . . courts look for a purposeful act by which defendant avails 
himself of the privileges and protections of the forum." Hennesey, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1203. 
In Hennesey, the court concluded that jurisdiction was proper since the "defendant [] 
chose to do business through its website with the plaintiff." Id. In contrast, such 
purposeful action is not present in this case. 
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some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws. 
Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added). That case 
involved a claim brought by a plaintiff against a California car dealership. Plaintiff 
purchased the car in California and subsequently moved to Utah, where she sued the 
California dealership. The Utah Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was not proper 
since the California car dealership had not directed any activities towards the State of 
Utah or its residents and because the contact in question was brought about by an action 
of the plaintiff rather than of the defendant. Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704, 
706 (Utah 1974). 
2. Starways v. Curry Supports Reversal 
The Court of Appeals improperly relied upon Starways v. Curry, 1999 UT 50 
(1999) in reversing the decision of the trial court. Starways, a Utah business, alleged that 
the foreign defendants libeled them "both in personal conversations and in nationally 
broadcast facsimile transmissions." Id. at p. 5. Starways is factually distinguishable 
from the present matter because the record in that case contained uncontroverted 
allegations that the defendants caused facsimile transmissions to be sent to Utah and that 
the defendants had personal conversions with individuals located in Utah. In the present 
matter, however, the record is uncontroverted that Mleads had no knowledge that the 
Email would be received in Utah and there were no additional facts supporting personal 
20 
jurisdiction. 
Moreover, this Court made clear that the decision in Starways would have been 
different had the defendants merely intentionally sent a facsimile without knowledge that 
the facsimile would be received in Utah. This Court articulated that 
We note that it may ultimately become clear that defendants did not cause 
defamatory facsimiles to be transmitted into Utah but did send them elsewhere 
and that it was reasonably foreseeable that a copy would end up in Utah. Such 
an attenuated nexus would not be sufficient, standing alone, to justify the 
imposition of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See Colder, 465 U.S. 
at 789 ("The mere fact that [a defendant] can 'foresee' that [a defamatory 
article] will be circulated and have an effect in [a state] is not sufficient for an 
assertion of jurisdiction") 
Starways, 1999 UT at p. 12, n3. The facts at bar present the circumstance distinguished 
by this Court in Starways. 
Judge Bench, the dissenting judge below, further distinguished Starways based on 
the nature of the alleged injury. In this case, there is no allegation in this case that the 
Email caused any "reputational, economic, emotional, or physical 'injury.'" Fenn, 2004 
UT App 412 at P20. In Starways, in contrast, plaintiff alleged injury to its reputation 
based upon defendants' allegations "that Starways was being sued for over one billion 
dollars and that the contracts Starways has with its carrier and suppliers are illegal. 
Starways, 1999 UT 50, plO, n2. Judge Bench's analysis recognizing the nature of the 
injury in question should be adopted by this Court. 
Finally, a claim based upon phone and facsimile communications is qualitatively 
different than a claim based upon a single email communication. In Starways, the 
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defendants sent facsimiles and made phone calls to Utah. Communications made via 
telephone lines necessarily include area codes, which reveal the location of the recipient. 
By contrast, an email address is location-neutral and includes no information which 
would give the sender reason to believe that the recipient was located in any particular 
jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, Starways is factually distinguishable from the present matter. 
Mleads had no "knowledge of the residence of the recipient or the location at which the 
recipient will retrieve the message". Fenn v. Mleads, 2005 Utah LEXIS 42 (Utah, 2005) 
(granting writ of certiorari). Moreover, the Starways decision expressly differentiated the 
facts in that case from the case at bar and advised that, without evidence that the 
communication would "end up in Utah", it would not be sufficient, standing alone, to 
justify the imposition of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 
C. THE COURT BELOW CONFLATED THE CONCEPTS OF VOLITION AND AIMING 
The Court of Appeals found that Mleads did not intend for any email to reach 
Utah. Nonetheless, it found jurisdiction because Mleads knew that email was being sent 
somewhere. The Court of Appeals held: 
Mleads directed its agent to solicit business, and that direction instantiates the 
purpose that makes the connection more than an "attenuated nexus." 
Fenn, 103 P.3d at 162. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals conflated the concepts of 
volition (i.e., intending to send an email) and aiming (i.e., directing an email to Utah). 
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See, e.g., Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 807 (9th Cir. 2004). 
The Court of Appeals also misapplied the "effects" test. 
1. Volition and aiming are distinct concepts in the jurisdictional analysis. 
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 787 (9th Cir. 2004) is a 
recent case that demonstrates that volition and aiming are distinct concepts in the 
jurisdictional analysis. Schwarzenegger involved a lawsuit brought by California 
governor Arnold Schwarzenegger who sued in California, and alleged that an Ohio car 
dealership utilized his likeness without his permission. The dealership had no employees 
or offices in the State of California, and otherwise did not transact any business there. 
Governor Schwarzenegger argued that the dealership's acts of propagating the 
advertisement was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, noting 
that while the dealership committed an intentional act, the dealership did not "expressly 
aim . . . its intentional act — the placement of the advertisement — in California." 
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806. The Ninth Circuit separated the intentional act and 
express aiming analysis. According to the Ninth Circuit, jurisdiction is proper where 
there is an intentional act which is also intended to have an effect in the forum state. In 
that case, the two elements were not present, because "[the dealership's intentional act. . . 
was expressly aimed at Ohio [where the advertisement aired] rather than California." Id. 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Mleads did not intend the E-mail to be 
sent to the State of Utah. See Fenn, 2004 UT App. 412, p. 2 ("Mleads did not know 
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specifically that the agent would send an email to Fenn or any Utah resident."). Because 
Mleads did not expressly aim its activities to Utah, jurisdiction is not proper. The fact 
that Mleads caused the E-mail to be sent (i.e., "[t]he extent to which [Mleads] caused the 
result of the important aspect of the analysis" Fenn, 2004 UT App. at p 21) is not 
determinative. Rather, a foreign defendant must purposefully avail itself of the local 
jurisdiction, not simply purposefully have conducted the act in question. 
2. The Court of Appeals recast and misapplied the effects test. 
The focus of the Court of Appeals on "[t]he extent to which the defendant caused 
the result" also misapplies the "effects" test set forth in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 
104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804. 
Calder involved a lawsuit brought by an entertainer who lived in California against 
defendants who lived and worked in Florida. Plaintiff sued, alleging that she had been 
libeled by an article published by defendants. Defendants argued that they should not be 
subject to jurisdiction in California because they were not responsible for circulation of 
the article in California. Defendants analogized themselves to the hypothetical welder 
who works on a boiler which later explodes in California. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. The 
Court disagreed, noting that "[defendants] are not charged with mere untargeted 
negligence. Rather, their intentional.. . actions were expressly aimed at California." Id. 
The Court relied on the fact that defendants knew that plaintiff (the subject of the 
allegedly libelous article) lived and worked in California, and that defendants' magazine 
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had the largest circulation in California. Id. Defendants' knowledge that their actions 
would affect plaintiff in California {i.e., defendants' specific knowledge that plaintiff 
lived and worked in California) and the fact that defendants knew that their libelous 
article would be transmitted to California were determinative in Colder. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals based jurisdiction on the fact that Mleads caused 
the e-mail to be sent. Unlike in Colder, in this case, Mleads had no a priori knowledge 
that the E-mail would harm Fenn in Utah. The Record is devoid of any evidence that a 
large part of Mleads's marketing efforts were focused on Utah. Applying Colder's test 
thus requires a finding of no jurisdiction. 
D. CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE REJECTED JURISDICTION IN 
SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES 
The majority of courts from other jurisdictions read the "effects" test set forth in 
Colder v. Jones as requiring "purposeful availment". Many recent cases involving 
actions taken, and injuries allegedly perpetrated, over the Internet, and which have had 
occasion to apply Colder, hold that Due Process—regardless of the effect of defendant's 
conduct—continues to require purposeful availment. See, e.g., Pavlovich v. Superior 
Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262, 270, 58 P.3d 2, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (2002). In Pavlovich, the 
California Supreme Court noted that "most courts agree that merely asserting that a 
defendant knew or should have known that his intentional acts would cause harm in the 
forum state is not enough to establish jurisdiction under [Calder's] effects test." 
Pavlovich, 29 Cal. 4th at 270 (emphasis added). Pavlovich involved a lawsuit filed by the 
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DVD Copy Control Association ("DVDCCA") against Matthew Pavlovich ("Pavlovich"), 
a Texas resident. DVDCCA alleged that Pavlovich misappropriated DVDCCA trade 
secrets by posting the source code of a program called DeCSS, which allowed users to 
circumvent CSS (content scrambling system) technology which generally prevented the 
playing of copyrighted motion pictures without the necessary algorithms and keys. 
Pavlovich had never been to California and had no direct contacts with California, but 
DVDCCA argued that since he knew or should have known that he harmed the motion 
picture industry by posting DeCSS, he should anticipate being haled into a California 
court. The California Supreme Court disagreed: 
DVDCCA's argument therefore boils down to the following syllogism: 
jurisdiction exists solely because Pavlovich's tortious conduct had a forseeable 
effect in California. But mere forseeability is not enough for jurisdiction, 
[citations omitted] Otherwise the commission of any intentional tort affecting 
industries in California would subject a defendant to jurisdiction in California. 
We decline to adopt such an expansive interpretation of the effects test. 
Pavlovich, 29 Cal. 4th at 277 (emphasis added) (citing Callaway Golf Corp. v. Royal 
Canadian GolfAss'n, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1200 (CD. Cal. 2000) (findingjurisdiction 
not proper against Canadian not-for-profit entity which allegedly libeled California 
corporation based on Canadian entity's presumed knowledge of California plaintiffs 
location and principal place of business) ("Merely knowing that a corporate [plaintiff] 
might be located in California does not fulfill the effects test.")). 
Many other recent cases have similarly rejected an expansive reading of Calder's 
effects test. For example, Young v. New Haven Advocate, involved a Virginia prison 
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warden's claims that he had been defamed by an article published by Connecticut 
newspapers and posted on-line. The reporters knew that the subject of the story resided in 
Virginia and made several calls into Virginia to gather information for the articles. The 
lower court accepted the warden's claims that jurisdiction was proper because the 
newspapers knew that the warden would be harmed in Virginia since he resided and 
worked there. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that the newspapers, "through the 
Internet postings, [did not] manifest an intent to target and focus on Virginia readers." 
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002). 
E. POLICY REASONS COUNSEL AGAINST THE SINGLE EMAIL RULE 
To find jurisdiction on the basis of one single un-targeted e-mail message alone 
would require every single business operating over the Internet to be apprised of, and 
comply with, a patchwork of state and international laws, even though a particular 
business may not have purposefully directed any activity to those jurisdictions. This 
requirement would place an untenable burden on businesses who only plan on conducting 
business locally and who may lack the necessary resources to conduct their business on a 
national scale. As stated by this Court: 
It requires but a moment's reflection to see what practical difficulties could 
result if the many thousands of retailers, who sell the many thousands of 
products, which are transported into other states, were required to defend 
wherever it might be alleged that the product had arrived and caused injury. 
Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah 1974). 
27 
F. EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT, THE EXERCISE OF 
JURISDICTION WOULD BE CONTRARY TO TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FAIR PLAY 
AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE 
Even if the Court finds sufficient contacts between Mleads and the State of Utah, 
Due Process further requires the Court to consider whether the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction offends "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Arguello v. 
Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992). This inquiry 
requires the Court to weigh (1) the burden on defendants; (2) the forum state's interest in 
adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient relief; (4) the 
interest of the interstate system in the most efficient resolution of disputes; and (5) the 
collective interests of states in furthering important substantive social policies. 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 100 S. 
Ct. 559(1980). 
1. The burden on Mleads is substantial. 
As recognized by the Court of Appeals, "traveling to Utah and hiring Utah counsel 
to defend itself in this case undoubtedly burdens Mleads, a small, Arizona-based 
company." Fenn, 2004 UT App 412, at p. 25. This factor weighs against reasonableness. 
Additionally, the burden on the non-resident defendant must be viewed in light of the 
importance of the conflict, which is often evidenced by the amount in controversy. Id. 
Admittedly, Mleads would be significantly taxed by being required to litigate this claim in 
Utah Courts. However, when viewed in the context of the amount in controversy (i.e., ten 
28 
dollars ($10.00) per e-mail (see R. 2, Complaint ^ 12) the burden on Mleads becomes 
unreasonable, and the exertion of personal jurisdiction contravenes traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice. 
2. The forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute. 
The forum state has an obvious interest in ensuring resolution of a claim brought 
by one of its citizens. In this case, however, two facts tip this factor against finding 
jurisdiction. First, as noted below, the plaintiff in this case asserts a violation of statutory 
rights and not an injury to person or property. Second, the Statute has since been repealed 
by the Utah legislature (see Utah Repeal of Unsolicited Commercial or Sexually Explicit 
Email Act, ch 278, § 1, 2004 Utah Laws 278), and Congress enacted a statute superseding 
the Statute (15 U.S.C. § 7701, etseq. (the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003) (providing that it 
"supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State 
that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages, except to 
the extent that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or deception in any 
portion of a commercial electronic mail message or information attached thereto"). These 
developments show both a diminished state interest in resolving these types of claims and 
a federal pronouncement that these types of claims are better regulated through federal 
laws. 
3. The plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief. 
Fenn undoubtedly has an interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief with 
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respect to her claims. However, "Fenn did not allege that she suffered any economic, 
physical, emotional, or dignitary damages." Fenn, 2004 UT app 412, p2. Thus, the 
strength of Fenn's interest is significantly less than it would have been if she were 
seeking to vindicate personal injuries or reputational injuries. 
4. The interest of the interstate system in the most efficient resolution of 
disputes. 
This interest of the interstate system requires this case to be dismissed The 
particular e-mail in question can subject Mleads to damages often dollars ($10.00). It 
makes little sense from an efficiency standpoint to force Mleads to expend far in excess 
of the amount of the claim to defend against the claim. A more efficient way to resolve 
the dispute is to place the burden on the plaintiff who is then appropriately incentivized 
(by the availability of attorney's fees) to bring the lawsuit or to refrain from doing so. 
5. The collective interests of states in furthering important substantive 
social policies. 
The repeal of the Statute and the enactment of federal legislation superseding the 
Statute greatly diminish the interest of the State of Utah in furthering the social policies 
the Statute targets. Instead, the facts of this case should be brought under statutes 
compliant with the federal legislation, instead of under the repealed Statute. 
Consequently, jurisdiction in Utah for this case is improper. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that Mleads is properly subject to 
jurisdiction in the State of Utah on the basis of one single e-mail that "Mleads did not 
know specifically . . . [would reach] Fenn or . . . any Utah resident." The Due Process 
Clause requires purposeful availment. In this case, Mleads did not purposefully direct 
any activity to Utah. Accordingly, Mleads respectfully requests this Court reverse the 
judgment below and direct the Court of Appeals to enter an order affirming dismissal of 
the Complaint by the trial court. 
DATED this 4th day of May, 2005. 
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APPENDIX A-l 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1. 
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Brittney Fenn, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, v. MLeads Enterprises, Inc.; and John Does I through X whose true names are 
unknown, Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20030948-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2004 UTApp 412; 103 R3d 156; 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 37; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 452 
November 12, 2004, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Writ of certiorari granted 
Fenn v. Meadst 2005 Utah LEXIS 42 (Utah, Mar. 17, 
2005) 
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Third District, Sandy 
Department. The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg. 
DISPOSITION: Dismissal vacated; remanded for fur-
ther proceedings. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
COUNSEL: Daniel Garriott, Denver C. Snuffer Jr., 
Sandy, and Jesse L. Riddle, Draper, for Appellant. 
Jill L. Dunyon, Salt Lake City, Derek A. Newman 
and Venkat Balasubramani, Seattle, Washington, for 
Appellees. 
JUDGES: Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme. 
OPINIONBY: JACKSON 
OPINION: [**158] JACKSON, Judge: 
[*P1] The district court dismissed Plaintiff Brittney 
Fenn's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction; Fenn ap-
peals. We vacate the dismissal and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] MLeads Enterprises, Inc. (MLeads), an 
Arizona corporation, contracted with a marketing agent 
to advertise MLeads's services to consumers. In August 
2002, Fenn, a Utah resident, received one unsolicited 
email that advertised MLeads's services. MLeads did not 
know specifically that the agent would send an email to 
Fenn or to any Utah resident. The email did not include 
"ADV:" in the subject line. Fenn brought suit against 
MLeads pursuant to the Unsolicited Commercial and 
Sexually Explicit Email Act (the Email Statute). See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 13-36-101 [***2] to-105 (Supp. 2003) 
(repealed 2004). [**159] Fenn did not allege that she 
suffered any economic, physical, emotional, or dignitary 
damages. 
[*P3] We must decide whether the state can exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who caused one 
unsolicited commercial email to be sent to a resident of 
the state, nl This issue is a matter of first impression in 
Utah and, as far as our research has revealed, in all of 
the United States. Accordingly, to aid understanding of 
the issue, we will describe the context in which this issue 
arose. 
nl Because the trial court disposed of this case 
at an early stage, some important facts remain un-
resolved. Specifically, the parties dispute whether 
Fenn had consented to receive the email in a pre-
vious visit to the website of a related entity and 
whether MLeads or its marketing agent had any 
means to discover the physical location or resi-
dency of the recipients of its email. The record 
also contains no information as to the nature of 
the agreement between MLeads and its marketing 
agent. 
We similarly have no information on whether 
an automated system or an employee generated the 
email. Simple software tools automate the process 
by which email are created and transmitted, en-
abling companies to eliminate employee involve-
ment after the initial programming. 
[***3] 
[*P4] In 1994, companies began to market via unso-
licited email. See Elizabeth A. Alongi, Note, Has the U.S. 
Canned Spam?, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 263, 263 (2004). Since 
then, the rate at which companies use unsolicited email to 
advertise has grown exponentially. See id. By 2003, fifty-
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2004 UT App 412, *P4; 103 P.3d 156, **159; 
512 Utah Adv. Rep. 37; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 452, *** 
six percent "of all email traffic" was unsolicited commer-
cial email. Id. It can be quite costly to Internet service 
providers and corporations to receive massive volumes of 
unsolicited email. See id. at 264. 
[*P5] In response to the growing problem, in 1999, 
Tennessee became the first state to require the characters 
"ADV:" in the subject lines of unsolicited commercial 
email. See Term. Code Ann. § 47-18-2501 (Supp. 1999). 
Three years later, Utah codified the Email Statute. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-36-101 to-105 (repealed 2004). 
The Email Statute required that unsolicited commercial 
email include "ADV:" as the first four characters in the 
subject line. See id. § 13-36-103(l)(b)(i) (repealed 2004). 
The Email Statute allows for civil enforcement by per-
mitting recipients to recover reasonable attorney fees and 
[***4] costs in addition to the lesser of $10 per email or 
$25,000 per day. See id. § 13-36-105(2) (repealed 2004). 
[*P6] By 2002, when the legislature passed the Email 
Statute, Utah became one of four states to have such legis-
lation. See id.; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-2.5-103 (2000); Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 50-6,107 (Supp. 2003); Tenn. Code Ann. § 
47-18-2501 (Supp. 2003). Thus, Utah's requirement was 
unusual but not unique, and such requirements had ex-
isted for three years by the time that Fenn received the 
email in this case. 
[*P7] Despite the four states' laws, the problem of un-
solicited email continued. In 2003 and 2004, twelve other 
states adopted legislation requiring "ADV:" in the sub-
ject line of unsolicited commercial email. n2 Finally, in 
2003, Congress passed legislation regulating unsolicited 
commercial email. See 75 U.S.C §§ 7701-1113 (Supp. 
2004). The federal law aims primarily at fraudulent or 
misleading email, rather than nonfraudulent, unsolicited 
email, as is at issue here. See id. The federal law does not 
require the "ADV:" text and preempts state statutes, such 
as the Email Statute. See id. [***5] 
n2 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1372.01 
(Supp. 2004); 815 111. Comp. Stat. 511/10 (Supp. 
2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1741.1 (Supp. 
2003); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1497 (Supp. 
2003); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 445.2503-.2508 
(Supp. 2003); Minn. Stat. § 325F.694 (repealed 
2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.1138 (Supp. 2003); 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-12-23 to-24 (Supp. 2003); 
N.D. Cent. Code § 51-27-04 (Supp. 2003); 15 Okl. 
St. Ann. § 776.6 (Supp. 2004); S.D. Codified Laws 
§ 37-24-6(13) (Supp. 2003); Tex. Bus. & Comm. 
Code Ann. § 46.003 (Supp. 2003). 
[*P8] This case requires us to determine whether 
a Utah court has authority to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant whose only contact with the state 
was to employ an agent [***6] who sent one unsolicited 
commercial email to a resident of Utah. Because this pre-
trial jurisdictional decision was made on documentary 
evidence only, it presents only legal questions that are re-
viewed for correctness. See Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 
UT50,P2,980P2d204. 
[**160] [*P9] The Email Statute has been su-
perceded by federal law, see 75 U.S.C §§ 7701-1113 
(Supp. 2004), and repealed by the Utah legislature, see 
Utah Repeal of Unsolicited Commercial or Sexually 
Explicit Email Act, ch. 278, § 1, 2004 Utah Laws 278. 
However, during the time in which the statute was in ef-
fect, the lower court announced its decision. We review 
the trial court's decision in light of the statutory scheme 
in effect at the time, i.e., while the Email Statute was in 
effect. See State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238,PP1, 41, 
32P.3d976; Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751P.2d248, 
249 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
ANALYSIS 
[*P10] To exercise jurisdiction, (i) a Utah statute 
must permit the court to exercise jurisdiction, and (ii) the 
exercise of jurisdiction must mcomport[] with due process 
requirements of the Fourteenth [***7] Amendment.'" 
Lee v. Frank's Garage & Used Cars, Inc., 2004 UT App 
260,P7, 97 P3d 717 (quoting In re W.A., 2002 UT 127, 
PI4, 63P3d607, cert, denied, 538 U.S. 1035, 155 L. Ed. 
2d 1065 (2003)). 
I. Statutory Requirement 
[*P11] Fenn argues that the Email Statute itself im-
pliedly confers jurisdiction because it creates a cause of 
action. However, even assuming that Fenn preserved and 
adequately briefed this point, the Utah Supreme Court 
recently foreclosed this argument: "Liability and juris-
diction are independent. . . . [The statute] speaks to lia-
bility only and does not purport to grant personal juris-
diction. Nothing in the statutory language indicates that 
the legislature intended to do so." MFS Series Trust III v. 
Grainger, 2004 UT61,P21, 96 P.3d 927, 504 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 7 (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, to convey 
jurisdiction, a statute must do more than merely create a 
cause of action. 
[*P12] Fenn alternately argues that the state's long-
arm statute, Utah Code section 78-27-24 (1998), confers 
personal jurisdiction over MLeads. The long-arm statute 
provides: 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or 
resident of [***8] this state, who in person 
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or through an agent does any of the following 
enumerated acts, submits himself... to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to 
any claim arising out of or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any busi-
ness within this state; . . . (3) 
the causing of any injury within 
this state whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty [.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(1 ),(3) (1998). Subsection 
(1) applies to this situation because advertising in the 
state qualifies as the "transaction of any business within 
this state." n3 Id. § 78-27-24(1). In any event, "the Utah 
long-arm statute 'must be extended to the fullest extenl 
allowed by due process of law.'" Starways, 1999 UT 50 
at P7 (quoting Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co 
Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985)); see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1969). Hence, whether the long-
arm statute provides jurisdiction in this case depends only 
upon whether due process permits the exercise. 
n3 Whether subsection (3) applies depends on 
whether a statutory violation constitutes an "in-
jury." We decline to address that issue here. 
r***Qi 
II. Due Process 
[*P13] A court can exercise two forms of personal 
jurisdiction: (i) general and (ii) specific. See Phone 
Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64,PU, 8 
P. 3d 256. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Neways, Inc. 
v. McCausland, 950P.2d420, 422 (Utah 1997). Fenn does 
not allege that Utah could exercise general personal ju-
risdiction over MLeads. Thus, we consider only whether 
Fenn established that the court could exercise specific 
personal jurisdiction. 
[*P14] A democratic government must exercise its 
powers against only those who have in some way as-
sented to the governmental power, such as by pursuing 
the benefits available in the forum. Accordingly, due pro-
cess requires that the defendant have "minimum contacts" 
with the forum jurisdiction [**161] "such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.'" MFS Series Trust, 
2004 UT 61 at PP9,10 (quoting International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, 326 US. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S Ct. 
154 (1945)). 
[•PIS] Courts previously have articulated [***10] 
the framework of personal jurisdiction analysis in sev-
eral ways. Compare Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 
50,PP8, 11, 980 P.2d 204, with Parry v. Ernst Home 
Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 661-62 (Utah 1989). Most re-
cently, Utah has applied a four-part analysis to the due 
process inquiry. See, e.g., MFS Series Trust, 2004 UT 
61 atPlO. Despite the differences in the organization and 
structure, this four-part analysis makes fundamentally the 
same queries as the other analyses. 
[*P16] First, the court considers if the defendant 
'"purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum state.'" Id. (quoting Hanson 
v. Denckla, 357 US. 235, 253, 2 L. Ed 2d 1283, 78 S. 
Ct. 1228 (1958)) (other citation and alteration omitted). 
Second, the court considers whether the claim arose out of 
the defendant's Utah activity. See id. (citing Neways, Inc. 
v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1997)). Third, 
the court considers if the defendant "should [have been 
able to] reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in 
Utah. Id. (citing Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110) [***11] 
(other citation omitted). Finally, the court considers the 
state's interest and "fairness" to the parties. Id. 
A. Purposeful Availment 
[*P17] Under the first prong, a state may exercise 
jurisdiction only against a defendant who has "purpose-
fully directed his activities at residents of the forum." n4 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US. 462, 472, 85 
L. Ed 2d 528, 105 S Ct. 2174 (1985) (quotations and ci-
tation omitted). For example, the United States Supreme 
Court deemed a defendant's activities "purposefully di-
rected" when a corporation placed products in '"the stream 
of commerce with the expectation that they will be pur-
chased by consumers in the forum State' and those prod-
ucts subsequently injured consumers." Id. at 473 (quot-
ing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 297-98, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980)). 
Likewise, the Court deemed a magazine publisher's ac-
tivities "purposefully directed" when the publisher dis-
tributed a defamatory story in the forum. See Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 79 L. Ed. 2d 
790, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984); see also Calder v. Jones, 
465 US. 783, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984)). 
[***12] 
n4 We recognize that a status exception exists 
to this rule, but it is inapplicable in this case. See 
In re W.A., 2002 UT 127, 63 P.3d607, cert, denied, 
538 U.S. 1035, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1065 (2003). 
[*P18] In a similar vein, in a case in which the 
defendants allegedly made defamatory statements to in-
dividuals in Utah and caused libelous facsimiles to be sent 
to Utah, the Utah Supreme Court held that a court prop-
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erly exercised jurisdiction. See Starways, 1999 UT 50 
at PP5, 12. Moreover, email contacts alone can establish 
jurisdiction when the contacts are extremely numerous. 
See Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F Supp. 2d 
601 (E.D. Va. 2002); Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 
E Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (involving millions of 
email); Washington v. Heckel, 122 Wn. App. 60, 93 P. 3d 
189, 193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (involving millions of 
email but not directly addressing personal jurisdiction). 
[*P19] The Utah [***13] Supreme Court noted 
in dicta in Starways that Utah could not properly exer-
cise jurisdiction against a defendant who "did not cause" 
communications "to be transmitted into Utah but did send 
them elsewhere . . . [even if the defendant could have] 
reasonably forseen that a copy would end up in Utah." 
Starways, 1999 UT 50 at PI2 n.3. "Such an attenuated 
nexus would not be sufficient, standing alone, to justify 
the imposition of personal jurisdiction—" Id. Thus, fore-
seeable but undirected contacts cannot justify a court's 
exercise of jurisdiction. 
[**162] [*P20] This case incorporates aspects of 
both the circumstances hypothesized in Starways and the 
intentional availment of forum markets in World-Wide 
Volkswagen but is not squarely on point with either case. 
In this case, unlike World-Wide Volkswagen, MLeads 
did not place a "product" into the stream of commerce. 
Moreover, Fenn does not allege that the email caused 
any reputational, economic, emotional, or physical "in-
jury." On the other hand, unlike the hypothetical situation 
posited in Starways, MLeads did cause the communica-
tions to come into Utah. 
[*P21] The extent to which the defendant [***14] 
caused the result is the more important aspect of the analy-
sis. MLeads caused its agent to send email, and the agent 
sent an email to Fenn, who is a resident of Utah. The 
record does not disclose whether the agent sent a large 
volume of email all over the country or whether it sent 
one email to Fenn specifically. In either case, MLeads 
directed its agent to solicit business, and that direction 
instantiates the purpose that makes the connection more 
than an "attenuated nexus." 
B. Reasonably Anticipate Being Haled Into Court n5 
n5 We dispense with the second query of the 
minimum contacts test because Fenn's claim clearly 
arose out of activity in Utah. 
[*P22] Under the next prong of our analysis, for 
a court to exercise jurisdiction, "defendants' 'conduct 
and connection with the forum State must be such that 
they should [have been able to] reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there.'" Synergetics v. Marathon 
Ranching Co., 701 P2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985) (quot-
ing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US. 286, 297, 62 L. 
Ed. 2d 490, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980)) [***15] (alterations 
omitted). This inquiry closely parallels the purposeful 
availment test: courts have exercised jurisdiction against 
a defendant whose activity was directed toward the forum 
state. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit has held that a court may exercise jurisdiction in 
a defamation case in which the defendant mailed a single 
letter into the forum. See Burt v. Board of Regents, 757 
K2d242, 244-45 (10th Cir. 1985). 
[*P23] Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme Court up-
held the exercise of jurisdiction against a defendant who 
sent email to a recipient in Arkansas. See Kirwan v. 
Arkansas, 351 Ark. 603, 96S.W.3d724, 731 (Ark. 2003) 
(discussing territorial jurisdiction over a criminal defen-
dant). The statute at issue in Kirwan made it illegal to 
"distribute," "ship," or "exchange" certain materials. Id. 
The court reasoned that the objectionable conduct was de-
livery of the email and thus that the conduct occurred in 
Arkansas, even if the email were sent from another state. 
See id. In the case at hand, the Email Statute made it ille-
gal to "send[]M noncompliant email "to an email address 
held by a resident of [Utah]. [***16] " Utah Code Ann. 
§ 13-36-103(1). In this context, "send" and "ship" are 
synonyms, and thus the conduct at issue here occurred in 
Utah, even if the "sending" was done from another state. 
n6 
n6 Without commenting on the adequacy of 
such a claim in Utah, we also recognize that a 
federal district court in Virginia exercised jurisdic-
tion on the basis that the out-of-state defendants 
accessed the Internet through an Internet service 
provider headquartered in Virginia. See Bochan v. 
La Fontaine, 68 F Supp. 2d 692, 695-96, 699 (E.D. 
Va. 1999). 
[*P24] In contrast, courts have held jurisdiction to 
be improper where a defendant maintains only passive 
contact with the forum, as through posting a static inter-
net website. See Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered 
Bank, 196 F3d 1292, 1298-99 (10th Cir. 1999); Patriot 
Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323-
24 (D. Utah 1998). Sending an email to a forum requires 
more purpose than maintaining a passive internet [*** 17] 
website, however. Thus, MLeads should have anticipated 
being haled into court wherever its email were received, 
even in Utah. 
C. State's Interest and Fairness 
[*P25] To assess the final prong of our analysis and 
2004 UT App 412, *P25; 103 R3d 156, **162; 
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determine whether jurisdiction would offend "traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice," 
generally, a court weighs: (1) the burden on 
the defendants; (2) the forum state's [**163] 
interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the 
plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient 
and effective relief; (4) the interest of the 
interstate system in the most efficient reso-
lution of disputes; and (5) the collective in-
terests of states in furthering important sub-
stantive social policies. 
Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773, 779 
(S.D. Miss. 2001) (citation omitted). First, traveling to 
Utah and hiring Utah counsel to defend itself in this case 
undoubtedly burdens MLeads, a small, Arizona-based 
company. 
[*P26] Second, by virtue of the fact that its legisla-
ture enacted this statute, Utah demonstrates an interest 
in preventing its residents from receiving noncompli-
ant email. Yet, this interest can be recognized honestly 
[***18] only as relatively minor. Fenn did not allege 
any injury. Fenn alleged that she received one statute -
violative email from MLeads. Utah has since repealed 
this statute, and Congress did not include the text require-
ment in the federal legislation. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-
7713. Further, when courts have found that personal ju-
risdiction did exist to enforce similar legislation against 
nonresident defendants, the cases involved allegations of 
fraud and millions of email, which are not alleged here. 
n7 See Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 
2d 601, 601 (E.D. Va. 2002); Internet Doorway, 138 F. 
Supp. 2d at 774\ Washington v. Heckel, 122 Wn. App. 
60, 93 P.3d 189, 191-92, 193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
Nonetheless, Utah has an interest in the enforcement of 
its statutes for the benefit of its residents. 
n7 Also, two of these cases were brought by 
Internet service providers, who suffer significantly 
more injury than an individual email recipient. See 
Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 
2d 601, 604 (E.D. Va. 2002); Internet Doorway, 
Inc. v. Parks, 138 F Supp. 2d 773, 774 (S.D. Miss. 
2001). 
r***|oi 
[*P27] Third, Fenn has an economic interest in this 
lawsuit. The statute provided that the recipient of an un-
solicited email could recover actual damages, or $10 per 
unsolicited email to a maximum of $25,000 for each day 
that the violation occurred, as well as costs and attorney 
fees. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105. Because Fenn 
pleaded no damages and received only one unsolicited 
email from MLeads, she could recover $10. n8 
n8 This assumes that because Fenn is not a 
lawyer she is ineligible to share the proceeds of the 
attorney fees award pursuant to rule 5.4 of the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct. See Utah R. Prof 1 
Conduct 5.4(a). 
[*P28] Moreover, while the test here does not explic-
itly consider the possible benefits to the plaintiffs attor-
ney, the Email Statute's award of attorney fees reflects the 
Utah Legislature's interest in encouraging private parties, 
such as Fenn, to enforce this statute. Because Utah bene-
fits from its attorneys earning fees and Fenn benefits from 
having [***20] attorneys who will represent her rights, 
such benefits should be considered. 
[*P29] Fourth, in considering "the interest of the 
interstate system in the most efficient resolution of dis-
putes," Internet Doorways, 138 F Supp. 2d at 779, we 
recognize that if we affirm the dismissal of this case, Fenn 
likely will have no recourse. n9 Such a dismissal may be 
an efficient resolution, but a dismissal would abandon the 
fifth factor, the "important substantive social policies" at 
issue in this case. Id. Accordingly, we hold that the inter-
ests of Utah and Fenn in prosecuting this case outweigh 
the burden placed on MLeads. Thus, the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction in this case is fair and comports with 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
n9 Fenn probably would not have a claim un-
der federal law, common law, or the laws of the 
states that arguably have more connection to the 
activities at issue here. The federal CAN-SPAM 
law was not in effect at the time and probably 
would not be implicated in this situation. See 15 
U.S.C. §§ 7701-7113 (Supp. 2004). Further, Fenn 
may have brought a common law trespass to chattel 
claim, but a successful claim would require Fenn 
to prove actual damages. See Intel v. Hamidi, 30 
Cal. 4th 1342, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 71 P.3d 296 
(Cal. 2003); Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 94 
Cal. App. 4th 1255, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d258, 261 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2002). Arizona, where MLeads is based, 
did not have a similar statute in effect at the time 
of this email, and its current statute provides for 
enforcement through the attorney general only. See 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1372.01 (Supp. 2004) (ef-
fective Sept. 18, 2003). Florida, where MLeads's 
marketing agent is based, has no similar provision. 
2004 UTApp 412, *P29; 103 R3d 156, **163; 
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[**164] CONCLUSION 
[*P30] Sending one email to a resident of Utah is 
sufficient "contact" to satisfy the long-arm statute and 
the minimum contacts requirement of due process for a 
statutory claim arising from the sending of that email. 
Additionally, the state's and Fenn's interests in this case 
trump the burdens imposed upon MLeads. Thus, we hold 
that the district court ruled incorrectly in dismissing this 
case on summary judgment for lack of personal juris-
diction. We vacate the dismissal and remand for such 
proceedings as may now be appropriate. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
[*P31] I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
[*P32] I DISSENT: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
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